


Three Philosophers React to Magnus Burnsides

by voidknight



Category: Philosophy RPF, The Adventure Zone (Podcast)
Genre: Crack Treated Seriously, Dungeons & Dragons References, Gen, Identity Issues, Metafiction, Philosophy, Screenplay/Script Format, Socratic Dialogue, Written for a Class, i can't believe 'philosophy rpf' is a real tag but i guess i'm using it, overanalyzing fantasy logic, sort of??
Language: English
Status: Completed
Published: 2020-02-18
Updated: 2020-02-18
Packaged: 2021-02-27 20:41:24
Rating: General Audiences
Warnings: No Archive Warnings Apply
Chapters: 1
Words: 2,381
Publisher: archiveofourown.org
Story URL: https://archiveofourown.org/works/22791892
Author URL: https://archiveofourown.org/users/voidknight/pseuds/voidknight
Summary: Shortly after having his mannequin body torn apart by the Hunger in the middle of "Reunion Tour," a recently-human-again Magnus finds himself in a room outside of reality, chatting with David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, and Dan Dennett. They are all very, very eager to speculate about his recent experiences from a philosophical perspective.I wrote this last semester to share with my Philosophy of Consciousness teacher!
Comments: 4
Kudos: 21





	Three Philosophers React to Magnus Burnsides

**Author's Note:**

> somewhat inspired by the homestuck fic "theater of coolty" - https://archiveofourown.org/works/3275858

[A small room with four chairs arranged in a circle, with four people in those chairs. Three of them are philosophers of consciousness: David Chalmers (author of  _ The Conscious Mind) _ , Thomas Nagel (author of “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”), and Daniel Dennett (author of  _ Consciousness Explained) _ . The other is Magnus Burnsides, a character from hit D&D-based fantasy podcast  _ The Adventure Zone. _ Magnus looks friendly, excited to interact socially, and also utterly clueless as to what is going on.]

MAGNUS: So, I heard you guys wanted to interview me!

CHALMERS: Yes! We heard you just went through some interesting experiences with regards to, well, consciousness and the like.

MAGNUS: I… what? Hold on, did I miss something? Where am I?

NAGEL: Hmm, this isn't ideal.

CHALMERS: Magnus, what's the last thing you remember?

MAGNUS: Oh man. I was just—oh, that's right, I just… those creatures tore me apart, didn't they! So I guess I’m dead or something? For now?

DENNETT: And yet he's still here talking to us.

CHALMERS: Hush. This is an entirely imagined scenario. How you got here isn't important.

MAGNUS: Okay! Probably better than being dead, although… oh, no, dying was sort of part of the plan, so—

DENNETT: Shouldn’t we get to the important questions before the meta-fictional strangeness of the scenario becomes too much?

NAGEL: Either way, it's rather interesting. But go ahead, David.

CHALMERS: You lost your body, didn't you, Magnus?

MAGNUS: Okay, let's be clear here, I didn't  _ lose _ my body. An asshole lich took it! That wasn't my fault!

CHALMERS: Of course.

NAGEL: It must be pretty hard to misplace one’s entire body!

DENNETT: Well, there have been cases where patients have reported feeling as if their consciousness have left their bodies. For example, in the common phenomenon of dissociation, one can feel as if they're in two places at once, or observing their body from afar—

MAGNUS: Okay but that actually happened to me.

DENNETT: You had a dissociative experience, yes.

MAGNUS: No, I like, the lich literally kicked me out of my body. He was in there controlling my body, and then me—uh, the spectral me, or my spirit, or whatever—I was floating up into this portal to the astral plane, so my friend Taako had to grab me and—

NAGEL: That's a lot to unpack.

DENNETT: Are you saying that your consciousness—your feeling of having an experience—was completely separate from your body in space?

MAGNUS: Yes???

DENNETT: Could you feel your body at all?

MAGNUS: No, the lich was controlling it!!

DENNETT: So not only were you dissociating, but you were experiencing a kind of locked-in syndrome?

CHALMERS: Dan, I think you're forgetting the purpose of this exercise.

NAGEL: Yes, shouldn't we try to listen to Magnus’ explanation of his subjective experience before we come to a judgement about it?

MAGNUS: No offense, but I’m feeling a little weirded out.

CHALMERS: Tell us what happened next.

MAGNUS: So, my friends pulled me back into this plane—uh, plane of reality, if that wasn’t clear—but since the lich was in my proper body, I got dumped into the body of a mannequin, which fucking  _ sucked— _

DENNETT: A… mannequin?

MAGNUS: —then I had to fistfight my real body and use all my weaknesses against myself, but then—

DENNETT: I think we need to pause here and think about this a little.

CHALMERS: Isn’t it clear? Magnus’ consciousness was transported into another being.

DENNETT: And you have no problems with this.

CHALMERS: I wouldn’t say that. But aren’t we supposed to be acting under the assumption that Magnus’ narration of his experience is accurate?

DENNETT: I don’t see why we should be making that assumption.

CHALMERS: If we don’t, we’ll lose track of our task! We’re here to learn something about consciousness, not whether or not Magnus is delusional!

MAGNUS: Excuse me??

NAGEL: Even assuming he’s telling what he believes to be the truth, we have no idea how accurate Magnus’ story is to his subjective experience.

CHALMERS: Exactly. We can never know what it is like to be Magnus. With that in mind, even if his claims aren’t entirely objectively true, they can still give us insights into that which is logically possible.

DENNETT: “Logically possible”!

MAGNUS: Can you guys  _ please _ just—hello?? I thought you wanted to interview me??

NAGEL: So. Working with the assumption, I guess, that Magnus had an out of body experience. Can we say that he, at that time, knew what it was like to be a mannequin?

[In the meantime, Magnus is staring at them, absolutely perplexed and more than a little miffed.]

CHALMERS: I don’t believe so. Consciousness is epistemically asymmetrical; the subjectivity of others’ experiences will always be impossible to know.

NAGEL: Didn’t you just say that we should assume Magnus is right?

CHALMERS: Well, yes and no. That is, we should assume that his experiences, though they seem fantastical, did happen. But if  _ Magnus’ consciousness _ was put into the body of a mannequin, isn’t he still  _ Magnus? _

NAGEL: Ah, I see what you’re saying. Forgive me, I should have been more rigorous in my assumptions. So—hmm. No, this is tricky.

CHALMERS: What’s confusing you?

NAGEL: Are mannequins conscious?

CHALMERS: I will tentatively say that they are not. But that may not be true in Magnus’ world. Magnus?

[Magnus has been zoning out. He perks up.]

MAGNUS: What?

CHALMERS: As far as you can tell, are mannequins conscious?

MAGNUS: Um… yes? Er, these ones were… animate, at least.

CHALMERS: Animated by what?

MAGNUS: Magic???

DENNETT: Something can be animate and have no subjective experience.

MAGNUS: Well, some of them waved at me. But then… hm. Well, they were all under the control of Lydia, I think? That’s the other lich. So they couldn’t help me with my attack until Taako got some of them under his control… but I did help convince them to fight the liches!

CHALMERS: Did these mannequins have free will?

MAGNUS: I… guess? A bit? Like they could make some decisions for themselves, but for the most part they were just being controlled.

NAGEL: Is free will necessary for consciousness?

MAGNUS: I don’t fucking know, man…

CHALMERS: Never mind. But as far as you could tell, the mannequins were, in some way, conscious.

MAGNUS: I mean, I assumed they were?? Oh god—when I got put in the mannequin body, did I kick a mannequin consciousness out of there to make room for me or something??

CHALMERS: If a mannequin’s consciousness is separate from its body in the same way yours seems to be—

NAGEL:  _ Anyway. _ I am still trying to figure out Magnus’ experience. I am going to argue that he does not, in fact, know what it is like to be a mannequin.

MAGNUS: Yes I do!

NAGEL: Do you? What is it like?

MAGNUS: Awful.

NAGEL: Let’s try to be a bit more objective.

MAGNUS: Fine! I couldn’t—couldn’t feel anything. At all. Didn’t have a proper sense of touch. I couldn’t breathe, couldn’t feel hungry, couldn’t feel my heart beating, anything like that! Is that what you want to hear??

NAGEL: You’ve described what it’s like to be Magnus in the body of a mannequin. You cannot know what it’s like for a  _ mannequin _ to be a mannequin. All your descriptions are based on what you know of your human body—you’re used to being able to feel, and breathe, and the like. A mannequin would never have known anything about these experiences. What it is like to be a mannequin would likely not include noticing that you have no heart, because that’s normal for you.

MAGNUS: All right, all right! So… wow. So if I have human memories I can’t be entirely mannequin?

NAGEL: You may have had  _ some _ insight into the mannequin experience, but not its  _ entire _ subjective experience.

MAGNUS: Hold on. But… being a mannequin changed some of my stats that are like, brain-related.

NAGEL: What?

MAGNUS: I had lower wisdom as a mannequin.

NAGEL: You…  _ what? _

MAGNUS: Like I had to do a wisdom saving throw?

NAGEL: I’m afraid I have no idea what you’re talking about.

MAGNUS: I… but I felt just as wise! What—? I… I mean, I have a wisdom stat, but is that something that… does wisdom not come from your mind?? Shouldn’t my wisdom have been the same if I was still Magnus mentally??

[The philosophers just stare at him. Magnus notices, and shuts up, but is clearly still agitated.]

DENNETT: What’s more troubling to me is that you were able to have a conscious experience inside a mannequin at all. As we all know, the mind is supervenient on the brain—

CHALMERS: Do we know that?

DENNETT: Yes. What we call consciousness is inseparable from the physical brain.

MAGNUS: ...I don’t think that’s right, is it?

CHALMERS: We don’t know.

MAGNUS: No, actually, we do know! I got my soul knocked out of my body! I  _ told _ you that like five times!

CHALMERS: ...Perhaps at this point we should just take Magnus’ claims at face value.

DENNETT: That’s defeating the purpose of the exercise!

CHALMERS: I just don’t think it’s productive to argue about the mind-body problem when we know that Magnus’ world includes things such as semi-conscious magical mannequins. Would it be too much of a stretch to say that, in his world, consciousness can be separated from the brain? Think of it as a thought experiment, not a modal argument about our own world.

MAGNUS: What is  _ your _ world anyway??

[Everyone ignores the question.]

NAGEL: Then when this lich was possessing Magnus’ body…

MAGNUS: Edward. The one possessing me was called Edward. Or, uh. He… he  _ was _ me, kinda, because he was in my body…

NAGEL: But Edward doesn’t know what it’s like to be  _ Magnus, _ does he?

MAGNUS: I guess not! Since he didn’t have my memories and stuff! Well… I don’t know that, but I don’t  _ think _ he… oh god, what if he did?

CHALMERS: Exactly! You’re catching on!

MAGNUS: Welp, doesn’t matter now, cause he’s dead!

NAGEL: You killed him? How?

MAGNUS: My friend’s magic umbrella ate him…?

[silence]

MAGNUS: Uh, but then Lydia disintegrated my flesh body, and that was that.

NAGEL: ...I see.

MAGNUS: Then a whole lotta shit happened, and by that I mean a  _ lot, _ and then later it turned out that this shady shopkeeper had been growing me a body in a vat for like months? From my blood? That I gave him?

[He pauses. No one responds, and Magnus clears his throat.]

MAGNUS: And then the problem was, well, if I went back into my body, I’d lose all my memories.

DENNETT: How… does that work?

MAGNUS: Well, the pod must’ve taken some of my DNA, right? So… okay. So it created a clone of how I was when that blood was taken. But none of my memories and stuff are in my DNA, so it would be… me, it would be genetically identical to me, but it wouldn’t be conscious.

CHALMERS: A phenomenal zombie!

DENNETT: Don’t get ahead of yourself, David. He said  _ genetically, _ not  _ atomically. _

CHALMERS: Yes… yes, of course.

NAGEL: Hold on. By the logic of Magnus’ world, shouldn’t memories not be tied to a physical brain? Magnus still had his memories as a mannequin.

CHALMERS: Perhaps moving back into a physical body overwrites those memories.

DENNETT: This is absurd.

NAGEL: Then what about Edward? The lich? In possessing Magnus’ original body, he presumably retained his own memories.

MAGNUS: I think they just told me it was a property of the pod that was making the body… oh. Wait. Wait, no, I got this wrong. I’m… I’m so confused, guys.

NAGEL: What is it?

MAGNUS: There was this guy called Barry who used one of these pods to remake his own physical body, and every time he did that, he… he’d remember some basic stuff about himself and his past and his childhood, but nothing after he became a lich and started needing to recreate bodies. Gonna be honest, I… don’t completely get it. But how would  _ those _ memories have transferred to the new body? Did the pod record them? How do memories even  _ work? _ How was I able to sacrifice my memory in—wait, how can I remember that I sacrificed memories—

[The door into the room opens, and in walks the one and only Griffin McElroy, legendary indie podcast producer, video game reporter, and one of the only men brave enough to film himself putting amiibos in his mouth. He is, of course, one of the creators of  _ The Adventure Zone. _

Griffin walks up behind Magnus and pats him on the shoulder, staring intently at the three philosophers.]

GRIFFIN: Okay, Magnus, time to go.

CHALMERS: And you are…?

GRIFFIN: Yeah, I have no idea how they even brought you here? This is so fucking weird. Let’s just get back to the podcast.

MAGNUS: My head’s starting to hurt.

GRIFFIN: Yeah, that’ll happen. Philosophers… they do that to you.

NAGEL: Do  _ you _ have an explanation for the way that memory and consciousness are stored in Magnus’ world?

[Griffin sighs loudly.]

GRIFFIN: Just… listen, guys, I don’t know what to tell you. Memory’s an important theme in the podcast, okay? The story’s more important than the scientific and philosophical rigor of the whole thing. I mean, we’re in a fucking Dungeons and Dragons fantasy setting.

DENNETT: You see? This whole endeavor was a waste of time!

NAGEL: I thought it was an interesting thought experiment.

MAGNUS: So… I did die, right.

GRIFFIN: Well, your mannequin body got ripped apart, remember that? So now you’re back in your flesh body. The one in the pod. And hey, you remember pretty much everything! Cause you’re here, now, right, and you’ve been telling these guys the story about the mannequins and whatnot.

MAGNUS: So the pod worked differently than we thought it would!

GRIFFIN: Yeah, something like that. Hey, listen, I’ll explain more later—let’s get out of this weird meta-fictional space first.

[He walks out of the room, beckoning for Magnus to follow. Magnus exits as well, but not before waving to the three philosophers, who, after a moment of confused silence, wave back.]


End file.
